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Abstract
This paper investigates the roles psychological biases play in empirically
estimated deviations between subjective survival beliefs (SSBs) and objec-
tive survival probabilities (OSPs). We model deviations between SSBs
and OSPs through age-dependent inverse S-shaped probability weighting
functions (PWFs), as documented in experimental prospect theory. Our
estimates suggest that the implied measures for cognitive weakness, like-
lihood insensitivity, and those for motivational biases, relative pessimism,
increase with age. We document that direct measures of cognitive weak-
ness and motivational attitudes share these trends. Our regression analyses
confirm that these factors play strong quantitative roles in the formation
of subjective survival beliefs. In particular, cognitive weakness is an in-
creasingly important contributor to the overestimation of survival chances
in old age.
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1 Introduction
Important economic problems, such as the decision about when to retire, how
much to save for retirement and whether to purchase life-insurance, depend on
the formation of survival beliefs over an individual’s life-cycle. A rational in-
dividual would be modeled as a statistician whose survival beliefs are given as
data-based (Bayesian or frequentist) estimates. For this rational benchmark, any
differences between subjective survival beliefs and their objective counterparts
can only result from an insufficient amount of data, and biases will decrease
when the individual collects more data with age. Empirical studies on subjec-
tive survival beliefs, however, do not support this notion of convergence of per-
ceived survival chances to objective survival probabilities. Instead, the literature
robustly documents a flatness bias, i.e., relatively young respondents (younger
than age 70) express underestimation, whereas relatively old respondents (older
than age 75) express overestimation of survival chances on average.1 Moreover,
we document that these biases are not negligible: on average, 65 year-old respon-
dents underestimate their survival probabilities by roughly 10 percentage points,
whereas 85 year-old respondents overestimate them by roughly 15 percentage
points. What is driving these age-dependent patterns of survival belief biases on
top of any statistical learning process?
We argue in this paper that the answer to this question is psychological factors.
In particular, we show that cognitive weakness/strength and pessimism/optimism
play important quantitative roles in the formation of age-dependent subjective
survival beliefs. As the first step leading us to this finding, we provide a descrip-
tive analysis of survival belief biases by comparing subjective survival beliefs
(SSBs) to objective survival probabilities (OSPs) using data from the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS). In the HRS, interviewees are asked about their be-
liefs on whether they will survive from the interview age to some target age that
is several years ahead. To compare these individual SSBs with their objective
counterparts, we estimate for each interviewee the corresponding individual-level
OSP by using the information on actual HRS mortality and several conditioning
1Inspired by Hamermesh (1985), a growing body of economic literature documents such a
flatness bias, cf., e.g., Elder (2013), Ludwig and Zimper (2013), Peracchi and Perotti (2014)
and Groneck et al. (2016).
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variables, including mortality trends. For this purpose, we adapt the methods
used by Khwaja et al. (2007), Khwaja et al. (2009) and Winter and Wupper-
mann (2014) to estimate mortality hazard rates at the individual level. Plotting
SSBs against OSPs over age, we document the flatness bias in the form of an
average underestimation of respondents of age 70 and younger, respectively, an
overestimation of respondents of age 75 and older. Within a given age group,
we find that respondents with low OSPs express overestimation, whereas respon-
dents with high OSPs express underestimation, resulting in a “flattening out” of
SSBs compared to the 45-degree line of OSPs.
To formally describe these biases, we next adopt the concept of inverse S-
shaped transformations of objective probabilities, as known from experimental
prospect theory (PT) (cf. Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992), Wakker (2010)). More specifically, we assume that SSBs can
be modeled as age-dependent Prelec (1998) probability weighting functions. In
line with the usual interpretation of the parameters of the Prelec function (cf.
Wakker (2010)), we assume that the motivational factor of relative pessimism is
expressed through the elevation and that the cognitive factor of likelihood insen-
sitivity corresponds to the flatness of the Prelec function. Likelihood insensitivity
refers to a cognitive weakness according to which people cannot distinguish well
among the respective likelihoods of events that are neither impossible nor cer-
tain. An extreme case of such flattening-out are fifty-fifty probability judgments,
which are well-documented in the psychological literature (Bruine de Bruin et al.
2000).2 Estimating age-specific Prelec probability weighting functions on our
data of SSBs, we find that the elevation of the Prelec function decreases with
age, whereas its flatness increases. These findings thus imply that the implicit
measures of the relative pessimism of respondents and their likelihood insensitiv-
ity increase with age.3
Our next objective is to compare the age patterns of these implicit cognitive
and motivational factors to directly observable counterparts. Because we do
not have individual-level data on relative pessimism and likelihood insensitivity,
2Gonzalez and Wu (1999) refer to these concepts as attractiveness and diminishing sensi-
tivity, respectively.
3Our finding of increasing likelihood insensitivity with age is consistent with Booij et al.
(2010), who also find that the elderly are more insensitive to likelihood.
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we look at proxies for these variables in the HRS. From wave 8 onward, the
HRS contains measures on dispositional optimism (pessimism) that are derived
from the same statements as in the well-known Life Orientation Test-Revised
(LOT-R).4 We find that dispositional optimism is decreasing with age, whereas
dispositional pessimism is increasing, on average.5 To obtain a good proxy for
likelihood insensitivity, we consider HRS measures on the cognitive weakness of
the respondent, which is motivated by a cognitive interpretation of likelihood
insensitivity (Wakker 2010). This cognitive measure is a version of a composite
score taken from RAND, and it combines the results of several cognitive tests.
We find that cognitive weakness is strongly increasing with age. Thus, these age
patterns are consistent with the age patterns of our implied measures of relative
pessimism and likelihood insensitivity that we obtained from the age-dependent
Prelec functions.
Finally, in order to estimate the quantitative impact of cognitive and moti-
vational factors on subjective survival beliefs, we combine the Prelec transfor-
mation of OSPs with the HRS data on direct cognitive and motivational mea-
sures. Specifically, we specify both parameters of the Prelec function—relative
pessimism and likelihood insensitivity—as linearly dependent on dispositional op-
timism (pessimism) and cognitive weakness. This linear dependence also features
a constant. With our estimate of that constant, we identify a significant base bias
in the form of a baseline inverse-S-shaped transformation of the objective survival
probabilities. We interpret this base bias as capturing incomplete statistical learn-
ing of, respectively, (rational) inattention to, the OSP of the individual. Thus,
the base bias reflects that individuals may only partially use their individual-level
OSP in their formation of subjective beliefs. Since the shape of the inverse S-
shaped transformation of OSPs attributable to this base effect is constant over
age by construction, changes in differences between SSBs and OSPs attributable
to the base bias reflect movements of the underlying OSPs. For example, because
OSPs are relatively high at the age of 65, the base effect induces an underestima-
4The Life Orientation Test-Revised questionnaire (LOT-R) was developed to measure dis-
positional optimism, i.e., a generalized expectation of good outcomes in one’s life (Scheier and
Carver 1987; Scheier et al. 1994).
5While it may seem that optimism is just the opposite of pessimism, psychologists measure
the two phenomena separately. We further explore the differences in Section 4.
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tion of long-horizon survival chances of approximately 10 percentage points. At
age 85, however, OSPs are relatively low and the base bias therefore induces an
overestimation of approximately 7 percentage points at that age. In addition, our
estimates identify a change of cognition over the life-cycle that describes a clock-
wise tilting of the probability weighting function in age so that lack of cognition
increases with age (the Prelec function becomes flatter). Relative to the base
bias, this leads to an additional underestimation at age 65 by minus 5 percentage
points and to an additional overestimation at age 85, also by 5 percentage points.
In contrast to these dynamic effects of cognition, the effects of the motivational
factors pessimism and optimism are roughly constant in age. Pessimism leads to
a downward bias by 5 percentage points, and optimism leads to an upward bias
by 10 percentage points.
We thus find that cognitive and motivational factors are important drivers
of subjective survival beliefs beyond any statistical learning processes that may
take place. While the motivational bias measured as optimism and pessimism
does not significantly change with age, cognitive weakness, measured as likeli-
hood insensitivity, does. We therefore conclude that cognitive weakness is an
increasingly important contributor to the overestimation of survival chances in
old age.
Relation to the Literature. Our work contributes to the economics litera-
ture on subjective expectations (Manski 2004), particularly on subjective survival
beliefs, which is inspired by Hamermesh (1985). On the one hand, the literature
documents that SSBs are broadly consistent with OSPs and co-vary with direct
measures of health, such as health behavior (e.g., smoking) or health status, in
the same way as OSPs (Hurd and McGarry 1995; Gan et al. 2005) in that SSBs
serve as predictors of actual mortality (Hurd and McGarry 2002; Smith et al.
2001) and that individuals revise their SSBs in response to new adverse (health)
shocks (Smith et al. 2001).
On the other hand, several authors document important biases in subjec-
tive survival beliefs when comparing sample average beliefs to objective survival
probabilities (Elder 2013; Ludwig and Zimper 2013; Peracchi and Perotti 2014;
Groneck et al. 2016). We emphasize that motivational (optimism and pessimism)
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and cognitive factors are important contributors to these biases. In this respect,
our work relates to medical studies examining the link between psychosocial dis-
positions and health shocks (Kim et al. 2011) or subjective body weight (Sutin
2013). Mirowsky and Ross (2000) and Griffin et al. (2013) study how incorpo-
rating motivational factors influences subjective life expectancy. We extend their
work by controlling for OSPs. D’Uva et al. (2015) investigate the effects of cog-
nition on the accuracy of longevity expectations. We go beyond their analyses by
combining motivational and cognitive variables and by focussing on probabilities.
Manifestations of biases driven by motivational factors have also been dis-
cussed in the behavioral learning literature in the form of confirmatory biases
(Rabin and Schrag 1999), myside biases (Zimper and Ludwig 2009), partisan
biases (Jern et al. 2014; Weeks 2015), and irrational belief persistence (Baron
2008). Simply speaking, people who are biased by motivational factors ‘only
see/learn what they want to see/learn’ so that any new information tends to
confirm already existing beliefs and convictions. One would expect that moti-
vational biases play an important role in the formation of survival beliefs, as
most people strongly dislike to die. According to Kastenbaum (2000) “[...], most
of us prefer to minimize even our cognitive encounters with death.” Under the
plausible assumption that “cognitive encounters with death” increase with age,
elderly people might express more optimistic attitudes towards their likelihood
of surviving. An age-increasing motivational bias in the form of optimism could
then explain why elderly people increasingly overestimate their survival chances
compared with younger people, for whom the prospect of death is less apparent.
Although our analysis confirms that a motivational (i.e., confirmatory) bias
is important for the formation of survival beliefs at all ages, we find that it
leads to a roughly constant bias in age, on average. If anything, our descriptive
analysis suggests that probability weighting functions express more pessimistic
rather than optimistic beliefs as individuals become older. In contrast, both
our descriptive and regression analyses suggest that cognitive weakness is an
increasingly important quantitative contributor to the overestimation of survival
chances over an individual’s life-cycle.
To model age-dependent survival beliefs, we employ a Prelec probability
weighting function applied to objective survival probabilities, which is a promi-
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nent approach in prospect theory (PT). As a generalization of rank-dependent util-
ity theories, pioneered by Quiggin (1981, 1982), modern PT has developed into a
comprehensive decision theoretic framework that combines empirical insights—
starting with Kahneman and Tversky (1979))—with theoretical results about
integration with respect to non-additive probability measures; cf. the Choquet
expected utility theories of Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987).
Of the many aspects of PT, our model of age-dependent biases in survival
beliefs is thus related to the experimental PT literature, which shows that sub-
jective probability judgments cannot be described as additive probabilities. To
be precise, the experimental two-stage PT literature shows that in a first stage,
subjective probability judgments (=beliefs) resemble an inverse S-shaped trans-
formation of additive probabilities, while in a second stage, these transformed
probability judgments themselves undergo another inverse S-shaped transforma-
tion (emphasizing pessimism) to become decision weights reflecting the decision
maker’s preferences; cf., e.g., Tversky and Fox (1995), Fox et al. (1996), Fox and
Tversky (1998), Gonzalez and Wu (1999), Kilka and Weber (2001), and Wakker
(2004, 2010). According to this two-stage approach, probability weighting is
relevant for the formation of beliefs and decision weights.6
Our findings contribute to the literature on the two-stage approach within
the special context of age-dependent survival beliefs. While the inverse S-shape
of probability judgments has typically been documented in experimental situa-
tions, only a very few papers document evidence of inverse S-shaped probability
judgments in non-experimental data.7 In contrast to experimental situations, for
6The two-stage approach is not uncontroversial. For example, Barberis (2013) argues that
probability weighting is exclusively a feature of preferences (recent contributions in this line of
literature are Woodford (2012) and Steiner and Stewart (2016), who postulate that perception
biases may arise as a second-best solution if the information processing capacity is limited or
if the processing is noisy). However, this view ignores, e.g., people who judge the chances of A
versus NOT A as fifty-fifty, even if they were told that the mutually exclusive events A, B, and
C are equally likely. Arguably, many real-life people commit such cognitive errors, “reflecting
insufficient sensitivity to changes in likelihood” (Wakker 2004, p. 239). While inverse S-shaped
beliefs are thus prevalent even in situations under risk—in which individuals are told objective
probabilities—they are apparently even more pronounced in situations under uncertainty, for
which no objective probabilities are provided; cf. Wakker (2004).
7For example, Polkovnichenko and Zhao (2013) and Andrikogiannopoulou and Papakon-
stantinou (2016) find evidence for inverse S-shaped probability weighting for option prices and
betting markets, respectively.
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which the experimental design can clearly distinguish between risk and uncer-
tainty, this clear-cut distinction does not apply to non-experimental HRS data
on survival beliefs: Although there exist OSPs, we cannot know how much the
subjects of the HRS are aware of these objective probabilities, so we look at a
hybrid situation for which both aspects, risk and uncertainty, are relevant. This
is reflected in our estimates of the base bias. Since it is plausible to assume that
assessments of long-run survival chances involve ample uncertainty, the strong
quantitative role of the base bias we uncover can be interpreted as a confirma-
tion that inverse S-shaped probability weighting is indeed very pronounced in
situations with uncertainty.
Importantly, it speaks to the robustness of the experimental PT findings on
probability judgments that we can confirm the typical inverse S-shape for the
survival belief data at all ages. Moreover, our regression analyses with respect to
direct motivational and cognitive measures support the typical interpretations of
the PT literature on probability judgments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
main stylized facts on survival belief biases. Section 3 provides a structural
interpretation of these biases through prospect theory. Section 4 looks at the
direct psychological measures elicited in the HRS. Section 5 quantifies the role
of cognitive and motivational variables for subjective survival beliefs. Finally,
Section 6 concludes. Separate appendices contain further information on the
data and additional results.
2 Age Patterns of Biases in Survival Beliefs
2.1 Data Sources
We base our estimates of subjective survival beliefs (SSBs) and of the correspond-
ing objective survival probabilities (OSPs) on the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS), which is a national representative panel study of the elderly US popula-
tion. Individuals are interviewed on a biennial basis. Interviews of the first wave
were conducted in 1992. The interviewees are individuals older than 50 and their
7
spouses regardless of age. An overview of the survey, its waves and the interview
cohorts is contained in Appendix A.
In our descriptive analyses, we use waves 8-11. In our regression analyses with
lagged variables, we use waves 9 − 11 (years 2006 − 2012) because motivational
variables are only available for waves 8-12, and our measure of the individual
level OSP is dependent on our index of contemporaneous cognitive weakness
index which is only available up to wave 11. To estimate the individual-level
objective survival probabilities (OSPs), we accordingly use waves 4 − 12 of the
HRS as well as data from the Human Mortality Database (HMD).8 For further
details on the sample selection, see again Appendix A.
2.2 Subjective Survival Beliefs
In the HRS, an interviewee i of age h is asked about her SSB to live to at least a
certain target age m, which we denote as SSBi,h,m. We focus on individuals in the
survey who are age 65 and older. This sample restriction is used because the data
set does not allow us to estimate OSPs for ages less than 65, with details provided
in Subsection 2.3 below. The assignment of target age m(h) to interview age h
for our sample is given in Table 1. Observe that the distance between interview
age h and target age m(h) is the same across all interview age/target age groups.
Table 1: Interview Age h and Target Age m(h)
Interview age h Target Age m(h)
65-69 80
70-74 85
75-79 90
80-84 95
85-89 100
Source: Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
8We explore the index of cognitive weakness up to wave 11 and compute panel mortality
between waves 11 and 12.
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2.3 Objective Survival Probabilities
To study survival misconceptions at the individual level, our first objective is to
assign to each individual in the sample its respective objective survival proba-
bility (OSP). Using aggregate data from (cohort) life-tables for this purpose9 is
ill-suited because individual (objective) survival rates generally deviate from sam-
ple averages. To estimate individual-level OSPs, we adapt the methods described
in Khwaja et al. (2007), Khwaja et al. (2009) and Winter and Wuppermann
(2014). We accordingly employ a duration model to estimate hazard rates condi-
tional on several individual-level characteristics. Among standard variables such
as age, socioeconomic status, and health behavior, the set of explanatory vari-
ables includes predicted average OSPs (AOSPs) in order to capture time trends
of mortality hazards. We extract the time trend by applying the Lee and Carter
(1992) procedure; see Appendix A.2.
We estimate the relationship between individual-level observable variables and
the AOSPs, both collected in xi, and mortality using a hazard function given by
λ(t|x′i) = λ0(t) exp(x′iβ), (1)
where time to failure t is the number of years to death. λ0(t) is the baseline
hazard, for which we choose the specification given by the Weibull (1951) haz-
ard model.10 This allows us to model duration dependence, i.e., the fact that
mortality rates are an increasing function of age. Accordingly, we impose the
structure
λ0(t) = αt
α−1 (2)
9As, e.g., in Perozek (2008), Ludwig and Zimper (2013), Peracchi and Perotti (2014),
and Groneck et al. (2016).
10A specification of the hazard function that allows for unobserved heterogeneity may be
preferable. However, when we tried to estimate the individual OSPs with a specification of
the hazard function that allows for unobserved heterogeneity, we faced serious convergence
problems in many of our bootstrap iterations. Thus, we compared the results of the first
bootstrap of a specification while allowing for unobserved heterogeneity with our specification in
the paper. The coefficient estimates and the estimate for duration dependence are very similar.
Additionally, we compared the distributions of the predicted OSPs for both specifications,
which are very similar as well. Hence, we are confident that our results are not affected much
by ignoring unobserved heterogeneity in our specification of the hazard function.
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which allows for α > 1 (capturing positive duration dependence). exp(x′β) is the
proportional hazard. In our estimation, survivors are treated as censored, and
we estimate function (1) by maximum likelihood.
The objective survival probabilities (OSPs) for all prediction horizons t and
each individual i of interview age h are given by (cf., e.g., Wooldridge (2002)
and Cameron and Trivedi (2005)):
OSPi,h(t) = exp
[− exp(x′iβ)tα] (3)
From this, we can also construct the OSP until the target age (with horizon t =
m(h)− h), OSPi,h,m(h), which we assign to the respective SSBi,h,m(h) of individ-
ual i.
2.4 Biases
Our following descriptive analysis compares individual-specific SSBs from the
survey data with our individual-specific measures of OSPs. As a first step, we
replicate the results of previous literature—e.g., Hamermesh (1985), Elder (2013),
Ludwig and Zimper (2013) and Peracchi and Perotti (2014)—on the age patterns
of survival beliefs in Figure 1. As a crucial difference from this literature, we
calculate average OSPs from our individual measures instead of using average
(cohort) life-tables. The step function in the figure is due to the change in as-
signment of the interview and target ages, cf. Table 1. Our findings confirm
the well-established flatness bias : At ages prior to age 70, individuals, on aver-
age, underestimate their probabilities to survive, whereas for ages above 75, they
overestimate it.
Next, we take a new perspective for which individual-level data are needed.
Instead of computing averages over age, we average over OSPs, i.e., for each OSP,
we compute the average SSB. In the upper left panel of Figure 2, we show the
corresponding results by plotting the average SSBs against the average OSPs. If
the SSBs are aligned along the 45-degree line, then there is no bias. However, we
observe a very systematic pattern of misconception: Individuals with low OSPs,
on average, overestimate their survival chances, whereas those with high OSPs,
on average, underestimate it.
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Figure 1: “Flatness Effect”
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
65 70 75 80 85 90
Age
SSBs OSPs (Indiv. Estimate)
Notes: Average subjective beliefs about surviving to different target ages (SSBs, solid line) and
corresponding average objective survival probabilities (OSPs, dashed line), cf. equation (3).
SSBs are elicited in the HRS for a combination of the age at interview of the individual (which
is shown on the abscissa) and a corresponding target age, cf. Table 1. The step function follows
from changes in the interview age/target age assignment. Source: Own calculations, Health
and Retirement Study (HRS), Human Mortality Database (HMD).
The two perspectives on the data taken in Figure 1 and the upper left panel
of Figure 2 suggest a very simple explanation for the observed biases across
age. Suppose that individuals were to always resolve any uncertainty about their
survival chances in a 50-50 manner (Bruine de Bruin et al. 2000), i.e., their
response were a weighted average of a fifty percent chance of survival and the
actual OSP. Such a 50-50 heuristic could obviously explain the pattern in the
upper left panel of Figure 2. Furthermore, young respondents in our data have
OSPs above 50 percent. If they were to apply such a simple heuristic, then they
would, on average, underestimate their chances to survive. Old respondents, on
the other hand, have long-run OSPs less than 50 percent, on average.11 Under
such a heuristic, they would accordingly overestimate their OSPs, on average.
Hence, such a 50-50 bias could simultaneously explain the patterns of Figure 1
and the upper left panel of Figure 2.
11Recall from Table 1 that the target age is several years ahead of the interview age.
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Figure 2: Objective Survival Probabilities and Subjective Survival Beliefs by Age
Group
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Notes: SSB over OSP by age group. The upper left panel is for all ages. The remaining age
group panels focus on different target ages according to Table 1. Source: Own calculations,
Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Human Mortality Database (HMD).
We next argue that there is more information content in the data, giving
rise to alternative interpretations.12 For this purpose, we repeat the previous
analysis for different age groups. In the remaining panels of Figure 2, we display
SSBs as a function of OSPs for each target age group; cf. Table 1. The figure
suggests that the flatness of SSBs against OSPs grows stronger with increasing
age—compare, e.g., age group 65-69 with age group 80-84. In addition, the
12The general notion of more information content beyond a mere 50-50 bias is also shared in
the earlier work by Hurd and McGarry (1995), Hurd et al. (1999), Smith et al. (2001), Smith
et al. (2001), Hurd and McGarry (2002) and Gan et al. (2005). We add to this literature by
emphasizing the roles of cognitive and motivational factors.
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intersection with the 45-degree line moves downward, from approximately 50
percent for age group 65-69 to approximately 40 percent for age group 80-84.
Therefore, the average tendency for underestimation increases across age groups.
Hence, it appears that, on average, pessimism and likelihood insensitivity are
both increasing with age. The next section provides a structural interpretation
of these biases and trends over age.
3 Modeling Subjective Survival Beliefs
3.1 The Prelec Probability Weighting Function
We interpret these biases in survival beliefs through the lens of prospect theory
(PT).13 More precisely, we take from PT the concept of inverse S-shaped prob-
ability weighting functions in order to model probability judgments in the form
of SSBs. The use of inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions enables us
to model the flatness of SSBs relative to the underlying OSPs shown in Figure 2.
We additionally aim at capturing the dynamics of the PWFs across age, i.e., the
increasing flatness of SSBs and the decreasing intersection with the 45-degree line
we observe in the remaining panels of Figure 2. We approach this by a specific
functional form assumption on the probability weighting function using a parsi-
monious parameterization, which, employing the terminology of Wakker (2010),
gives rise to two psychological interpretations of these data features. First, the in-
creasing flatness reflects, along a cognitive dimension, an increasing insensitivity
to the objective likelihood of the decision maker (likelihood insensitivity). Second,
the decreasing intersection with the 45-degree line reflects increasing pessimism,
respectively, decreasing optimism, and hence a motivational interpretation of the
data. Our aim is to estimate these implicit cognitive and motivational measures.14
13As a generalization of rank dependent utility theories (pioneered by Quiggin (1981, 1982)),
modern prospect theory (PT) (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) has developed into a comprehen-
sive decision theoretic framework that combines empirical insights (starting with Kahneman
and Tversky (1979)) with theoretical results regarding integration with respect to non-additive
probability measures (cf. the Choquet expected utility theories of Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa
(1987)).
14Our estimates may be biased by two important features of the data. First, for the oldest
two age groups, we only cover part of the full support of OSPs, because the long-run objective
13
To simultaneously capture these cognitive and motivational dimensions, we
adopt the non-linear probability weighting function (PWF) suggested by Prelec
(1998). Consider the mapping of the OSP to the SSB according to
SSB =
(
exp
(
− (− ln (OSP ))ξ
))θ
(4)
for parameters ξ ≥ 0, θ ≥ 0. These two parameters control the elevation and
the curvature of the function, which can be interpreted as measures of pes-
simism/optimism and likelihood insensitivity, respectively.
To see this, observe that for ξ = θ = 1, function (4) coincides with the 45-
degree line. Holding θ constant at one, an increase of ξ above one leads to an
S-shaped pattern and a decrease below one leads to an inverse S-shape, whereby
the intersection with the 45-degree line is at the objective probability of OSP =
exp(−1) ≈ 0.37.15 This dependency on ξ is illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 3,
where we decrease ξ from one to zero.16 In the limit where ξ = 0, the curve
is flat. Hence, ξ can be interpreted as a measure of likelihood insensitivity:
lowering ξ decreases the responsiveness of the SSB in the OSP, i.e., there is a
lower likelihood sensitivity, respectively, higher likelihood insensitivity. As we
further illustrate in Panel (b) of Figure 3, decreasing θ leads to an upward shift
of the PWF, whereas increasing it leads to a downward shift. Accordingly, θ can
be interpreted as a measure of relative pessimism whereby a higher value of θ
means higher pessimism. Finally, notice that unless θ = 1 (or ξ = 1), these two
properties of the PWF interact. This can be seen in Panel (b) of Figure 3, where
varying the pessimism parameter θ simultaneously affects the shape (slope) of
the probability weighting function.
survival chances do not exceed 70%, respectively, 50%, for these two groups, cf. Figure 2. This
censoring of the data may bias our estimates for these groups. Second, survival chances are
naturally bounded from below by zero and from above by one so that respondents with very
high (low) objective survival probabilities cannot overestimate (underestimate) their survival
chances by much, whereas the respective other side is less limited. This may induce a flatness
of the PWFs; see also our discussion in Section 5.
15For ξ 6= 1, SSB = OSP iff − ln(SSB) = − ln(OSP ) = 1; hence, SSB = OSP =
exp(−1) ≈ 0.37.
16Given the data patterns shown in Figure 2, which resemble an inverse S at all interview
ages, a parameterization with ξ > 1 is irrelevant in our context.
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Figure 3: Pessimism and Likelihood Sensitivity in Stylized PWF
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Notes: Stylized Prelec (1998) probability weighting functions. The left panel shows the impact
of likelihood insensitivity, ξ, for θ = 1 and ξ ∈ [0, 0.5, 0.9, 1]. The right panel shows the impact
of pessimism for ξ = 0.5 and θ ∈ [0.7, 1, 1.3].
3.2 Age-Dependent Probability Weighting Functions
We next postulate that relationship (4) is an appropriate model for each indi-
vidual i’s subjective belief of surviving from current (interview) age h to some
future age t. Accordingly, we specify for a given OSPi,h,t that
SSBi,h,t =
(
exp
(
− (− ln (OSPi,h,t))ξh
))θh
+ i,h,t. (5)
The error term i,h,t captures errors both in our measures of objective survival
probabilities and in the round-off in answering patterns.17 Notice that param-
eters θh, ξh are now (interview) age h specific. Through this, we capture the
dependency of survival belief formation on the current age, as suggested by the
age group-specific bias patterns displayed in Figure 2.
To estimate parameters ξh, θh, we further restrict these parameters to be the
same for each interview age h assigned with a specific target age m(h), i.e., we
let ξh = ξ¯m(h) and θh = θ¯m(h). We identify these parameters under this con-
straint by minimizing the Euclidean distance between the predicted and reported
17One specific form of round-off is the tendency to provide focal point answers at SSBs of
0%, 50% or 100%.
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subjective survival beliefs for each individual in group m(h) using the data of
Figure 2.
Figure 4 shows the predicted probability weighting functions with the corre-
sponding 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are bootstrapped and con-
fidence intervals are computed using the percentile method.18,19 For the fitted
values of the full sample displayed in the upper left panel, we observe a quite
symmetric weighting function intersecting the 45-degree line close to 0.5. As al-
ready suggested by the pattern in Figure 2, the age-specific weighting functions
depicted in the other panels in Figure 4 reveal two facts: First, the functions be-
come flatter with increasing age, and second, the intersection with the 45-degree
line is at lower values for older ages—it is at approximately 55 percent for age
group 65-69 and at approximately 40 percent for age group 80-84.
Figure 5 depicts the parameter estimates ξh = ξ¯m(h), θh = θ¯m(h), again with
the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. The coefficient estimates ξh = ξ¯m(h),
shown in Panel (a) of the figure, are decreasing in h, which according to our
interpretation captures increasing likelihood insensitivity. Note, however, that
the differences between age groups are not always statistically significant.
Estimates θh = θ¯m(h), shown in Panel (b), show a less clear-cut age pattern.
They are increasing between interview age groups 70-74 and 85-89, but the con-
fidence bands for the oldest group are rather large. The estimated pessimism
parameters are also decreasing from age group 65-69 to age group 70-74. Overall,
we can conclude that pessimism also tends to increase for ages above 70.
In Appendix B, we also investigate the robustness of these results by use of
linear probability weighting function and thereby confirm our main findings: im-
plied measures of likelihood sensitivity (pessimism) tend to decrease (increase)
with age. In the next section, we turn to direct measures of cognitive and moti-
18Since our data are clustered, we perform a cluster bootstrap that samples the clusters with
replacement. Thus, in each bootstrap, we solve
min
ξ¯m(h),θ¯m(h)

Nm(h)∑
i=1
[
i,h,m(h)
]2 .
19The percentile method uses the relevant percentiles of the empirical distribution of our
bootstrap estimates of the Prelec parameters.
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Figure 4: Estimated Non-linear Probability Weighting Functions
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Notes: Estimated Prelec probability weighting functions for the full sample (upper left panel)
and for different age groups. Parameters estimated with non-linear least squares. Source: Own
calculations, Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Human Mortality Database (HMD).
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Figure 5: Estimated Prelec Parameters: Likelihood Sensitivity and Pessimism
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Notes: This figure shows estimates of ξh = ξ¯m(h) in Panel (a), estimates of θh = θ¯m(h) in
Panel (b), and the bootstrapped (1,000 replications) 95% confidence intervals, which are based
on the percentile method. Source: Own calculations, Health and Retirement Study (HRS),
Human Mortality Database (HMD).
vational variables to investigate whether we can observe similar age patterns.
4 Direct Psychological Measures
4.1 Measures
From wave 8 onward, the HRS contains measures on optimism and pessimism.
Measures on dispositional optimism (pessimism) are derived from the same state-
ments as in the well-known Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R).20 Respon-
dents are given various statements regarding a specific latent variable. For most
variables, they were asked “please say how much you agree or disagree with the
following statements”. Each statement is rated on a scale from one (strongly
disagree) to six (strongly agree). Average scores are taken to create indices for
each motivational construct. Higher values for the motivational variables imply
more-optimistic, respectively, more pessimistic, attitudes.21
20Such statements are, e.g., “In uncertain times I usually expect the best”.
21The index score is set to missing if responses on more than half of the respective statements
are missing.
18
Figure 6: Histogram of Optimism and Pessimism
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Notes: Histograms of ’optimism’ and ’pessimism’ variables. Averages of answer scale, where
1 indicates ’strongly disagree’ and 6 ’strongly agree’. Source: Health and Retirement Study
(HRS).
Note that optimism and pessimism are usually measured separately, i.e., re-
spondents are asked questions with negative connotations (pessimism) or positive
connotations (optimism). The reason for separate measures is that these two con-
cepts were found to display bi-dimensionality (Herzberg et al. 2006). Figure 6,
showing the histograms on both measures in our sample, underscores this aspect.
Dispositional pessimism shows a clear focal point at index value 1 (=“strongly
disagree”), whereas dispositional optimism apparently has focal point answers at
values 4, 5 and 6, and the peak is at 5. In our empirical analyses, we therefore
use separate variables for each concept, although in our previous descriptive and
theoretical analyses, we speak of increasing pessimism and decreasing optimism
interchangeably.
For a measure corresponding to likelihood insensitivity, our choice of a proxy
variable is motivated by our cognitive interpretation of likelihood insensitiv-
ity (Wakker 2010). Thus, we include a variable measuring the cognitive weakness
of the respondent. It is a version of a composite score taken from RAND and
combines the results of several cognitive tests. For instance, respondents were
asked to recall a list of random words, to count backwards and to name the (Vice)
President of the United States. In total, there are 35 questions and the results are
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summarized in an ability score. We take RAND’s composite score of cognitive
ability as given and create our score of cognitive weakness. For this purpose,
we subtract the cognitive ability score from the maximal achievable value, i.e.,
our measure of cognitive weakness is 35 minus cognitive ability. A higher score
indicates higher cognitive weakness.
An overview of our three measures of cognitive and motivational variables is
given in Table 2.
Table 2: Cognitive and Motivational Variables
Min Max Mean SD
Cognitive Variable
Cognitive Weakness 0 35 13.56 5.19
Motivational Variables
Dispositional Optimism 1 6 4.51 1.15
Dispositional Pessimism 1 6 2.56 1.26
Notes: This table summarizes the sample moments our measure of cognitive weakness
and the two motivational variables, dispositional optimism and pessimism. Source: Own
calculations, Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
4.2 Age Patterns
Figures 7 and 8 display the age patterns of cognitive weakness and of the two
motivational measures, respectively. The average index value of cognitive weak-
ness is quite strongly and statistically significantly increasing from 11.8 to 17.9
between ages 65 and 89. Optimism decreases by 2.9% and pessimism increases
by 12.2% from age 65 to 90, but both age patterns are less pronounced.22 That
pessimism increases more strongly than optimism decreases supports the notion
of the bi-dimensionality of these two measures.
Hence, the age trends of the direct cognitive and motivational measures coin-
cide with the indirect measures we derived from estimating probability weighting
22Regressing the average cognition, pessimism and optimism on age gives slope coefficients
of 0.2341, 0.0080 and −0.0055, respectively.
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Figure 7: Average Cognitive Weakness Score over Age
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Notes: Average cognitive weakness score over age with 95% confidence-interval calculated based
on a normality assumption. The straight line shows the prediction of a linear regression of cog-
nitive weakness against age. Source: Own calculations, Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
Figure 8: Average Optimism and Pessimism over Age
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Notes: Average optimism and pessimism scores over age with 95% confidence intervals cal-
culated based on a normality assumption. The straight line shows the prediction of a linear
regression of optimism (pessimism) against age. Source: Own calculations, Health and Retire-
ment Study (HRS).
functions on the data of subjective survival beliefs. These findings lead us to
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conjecture that cognition and motivational attitudes play a strong role in the
formation of subjective survival beliefs. Our next aim is to investigate this inter-
pretation of the data further through regression analyses.
5 Regression Analyses
5.1 Parameterized Non-linear PWFs
To investigate whether our measures of cognitive and motivational factors play a
role in the formation of subjective survival beliefs and to quantify their impact,
we consider a parameterized variant of the Prelec (1998) function. Specifically,
we postulate that for each individual in the sample i and each age h, the implicit
measures of cognition, ξi,h, and optimism/pessimism, θi,h, from equation (5) are
linearly dependent on the cognitive, respectively, motivational, variables as fol-
lows:
ξi,h = ξ0 + ξ1ci,h−2 (6a)
θi,h = θ0 + θ1pi,h−2 + θ2oi,h−2 (6b)
In the above, ci,h−2 is the lag of our measure of cognitive weakness, and pi,h−2
is the lag of our measure of pessimism, whereas oi,h−2 is the lag of our measure
of optimism. Using lags of these measures allows us to treat them as weakly
exogenous so that we avoid spurious correlation23. It also allows us to interpret
our findings on the relationship between cognitive and motivational measures and
SSBs, at least tentatively, as causal.24
Replacing in (5) the age-specific parameters ξh and θh with the individual and
age-specific parameters ξi,h, θi,h and using (6), our specification of survival beliefs
23E.g., health shocks may affect cognition and motivational attitudes directly and lead to
adjustments of subjective survival beliefs.
24While the approach of using lags for causal identification is widespread in the social sciences,
this approach is not without criticism; cf. Bellemare et al. (2015). We therefore speak of a
“tentative” interpretation. Our results hold unchanged if we use contemporaneous measures
of our cognitive and motivational variables (available upon request). Reporting those instead
would change our wording in statements such as “a change of cognition (or pessimism) leads to
a change of SSBs by factor x”, where “leads to” would be replaced with “is associated with”.
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reads as
SSBi,h,m(h) =
(
exp
(
− (− ln (OSPi,h,m(h)))ξ0+ξ1ci,h−2))θ0+θ1pi,h−2+θ2oi,h−2 , (7)
which we estimate on the pooled sample of HRS data.
Turning to the parameters of interest in specification (7), we refer back to our
analysis of Section 3, in particular to the illustration in Figure 3. In light of our
discussion there, parameters ξ0 and θ0 capture a base effect in subjective beliefs.
With regard to the base effect in cognition, ξ0, we conjecture that this base
effect indeed exists in form of an inverse S, and therefore, we expect ξ0 ∈ (0, 1).
This may reflect an average degree of cognitive weakness, incomplete statistical
learning, (rational) inattention with respect to objective survival probabilities
or a statistical artifact from truncation of the data.25 On the other hand, with
regard to a base effect in optimism/pessimism captured θ0 6= 1, we do not have
a specific prior expectation. Recall from our discussion in Section 3 that θ0 <
1 reflects rather optimistic beliefs, whereas θ0 > 1 reflects rather pessimistic
beliefs. Depending on which of these two motivational factors dominate, we would
find an average upward or downward shift of the probability weighting function.
Furthermore, recalling the illustrative analysis of Figure 3, a lower likelihood
sensitivity, ξh, leads to a flatter PWF. Therefore, if changes in cognitive weakness
are relevant to the formation of subjective beliefs, we would find its coefficient to
be negative, ξ1 < 0. Also, since increasing relative pessimism, θh, leads to a lower
elevation of the PWF, we expect that θ1 > 0. Likewise, since increasing relative
optimism leads to a higher elevation, we expect that θ2 < 0. To summarize, our
main hypotheses on the signs of the coefficients are that ξ0 ∈ (0, 1), ξ1 < 0, θ1 > 0
and θ2 < 0. We do not have a hypothesis on the sign of θ0.
Our main results summarized in Table 3 show that there is indeed a sig-
nificant average inverse-S-shaped transformation of objective survival probabili-
ties (ξ0 = 0.54 < 1). At the same time, we do not identify an additional baseline
shifter of the PWF that would reflect average optimistic or pessimistic beliefs, be-
cause θ0 is not statistically different from 1 and the point estimate is close to one.
25SSBs cannot be less than zero or above one. Such truncation may induce overestimation,
on average, for OSPs close to zero and underestimation for OSPs close to one, which leads to
a natural flatness of the PWF relative to the 45-degree line.
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Thus, the base effect exclusively captures factors that lead to an inverse-S of the
PWF relative to the 45-degree line, without additional shifting. Since we cannot
distinguish between the alternative explanations for this effect discussed above,
we subsequently speak of this average base effect simply as a base bias. Beyond
the base bias, increasing lack of cognition leads to increasing likelihood insensi-
tivity (ξ1 = −0.01), which flattens the non-linear PWF. Furthermore, increasing
pessimism leads to a significant downward shift (θ1 = 0.029) and increasing op-
timism to a significant upwards shift (θ2 = −0.05) of the non-linear PWF. Thus,
cognitive and motivational factors do have a significant effect on the formation
of subjective survival beliefs of the expected sign.
Table 3: The Effects of Cognition and Motivational Measures on Subjective Sur-
vival Beliefs
point estimate CI- CI+
Cog.Weak. Intercept (ξ0) 0.5457 0.4952 0.5955
Cog.Weak. Slope (ξ1) -0.0134 -0.0170 -0.0095
Psycho. Intercept (θ0) 1.0285 0.9471 1.1160
Pessimism Slope (θ1) 0.0295 0.0176 0.0420
Optimism Slope (θ2) -0.0583 -0.0722 -0.0435
OSP0 0.3513 0.2948 0.4144
AIC 2990.0 2778.1 3190.8
Notes: Number of observations: 8858. Column 2 shows the point estimates. Columns 3 and
4 show the respective bounds of the bootstrapped 95%-confidence intervals (CI- and CI+),
which are based on the percentile method (1,000 replications). AIC: Akaike (1973) informa-
tion criterion. Source: Own calculations, Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
To quantify the impact of these factors, we next compute the predicted sub-
jective beliefs of the probability weighting function. To isolate the effect of each
factor, we decompose the probability weighting function into the following ele-
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ments:
base bias: SSBbi,h,m(h) =
(
exp
(
− (− ln (OSPi,h,m(h)))ξ0))θ0 (8a)
base + cogn. weakn.: SSBbci,h,m(h) =
(
exp
(
− (− ln (OSPi,h,m(h)))ξ0+ξ1ci,h−2))θ0
(8b)
base + pess.: SSBbpi,h,m(h) =
(
exp
(
− (− ln (OSPi,h,m(h)))ξ0))θ0+θ1pi,h−2
(8c)
base + opt.: SSBboi,h,m(h) =
(
exp
(
− (− ln (OSPi,h,m(h)))ξ0))θ0+θ2oi,h−2
(8d)
To carry out this decomposition, we first predict the full model and the sub-
PWFs defined in (8) for each individual and then take sample averages. In
our subsequent description, we denote these respective predicted values by ̂ ,
i.e., ŜSB stands for the sample average of the predicted PWFs under the “full”
model, equation (7), and so forth.
The results on the predictions for the full model and its decomposition are
displayed in Figure 9. The predicted base bias ŜSB
b
(“base bias”) displays a pro-
nounced inverse S and intersects with the 45-degree line at ÔSP 0 = 0.35. Since
the estimate θˆ0 is close to one, this intersection is close to the theoretical inter-
section at exp(−1) ≈ 0.37; cf. Section 3, in particular Figure 3. Predictions for
the base bias plus changes in cognitive weakness ŜSB
bc
(“base + cogn. weakn.”)
lead to a clockwise rotation of the PWF, while the intersection with the 45-degree
line stays at roughly ÔSP 0 = 0.35, which again is a consequence of θˆ0 ≈ 1. The
predictions from the base model with optimism, ŜSB
bo
(“base + opt.”), imply
a parallel upward shift relative to the base model, which dominates the smaller
downward shift of pessimism; see ŜSB
bp
(“base + pess.”). As a consequence of
all these effects, the PWF in the full model (“full”) is both flatter and shifted
upwards relative to the PWF of the base bias.
Figure 10 provides the decomposition over age, relating us back to Figure 1.
Panel (a) shows the data on SSBs and OSPs (i.e., the data points of Figure 1)
and the predicted values for the full model and for the base bias. Overall, the
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Figure 9: Decomposition of Non-linear PWFs
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equations (7) and (8); “full”: ŜSB; “base cogn. weakn.”: ŜSB
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. Source: Own calculations, Health and Retirement
Study (HRS), Human Mortality Database (HMD).
full model displays a very close match to the average data on SSBs. Consistent
with our findings in Figure 9, the base bias leads to a stronger underestimation
than in the full model. Panel (b) provides the differences relative to the base
bias caused by changes of cognitive weakness with age, the parallel shifts induced
by pessimism and optimism, and, finally, the full model. That is, we show the
differences between (8b), (8c), respectively, (8d)) to (8a), and we denote these
differences by ∆. Due to the increasing cognitive weakness over age, individuals,
on average, overestimate their survival chances increasingly more as they grow
older: relative to the base bias, cognitive weakness initially leads to a down-
ward bias of approximately -5%p and eventually to an overestimation by slightly
more than 5%p. We also observe that pessimism leads to an underestimation
of survival chances by roughly -5%p and optimism to a strong overestimation
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by approximately 10%p for all age groups. Overall, the effects of cognitive and
motivational variables on subjective survival beliefs are quite strong, with a net
effect of approximately 2%p for age group 65-69 and almost 12%p for age group
85-89. Importantly, the effects of cognitive factors are changing with age, whereas
the effects of the two motivational factors optimism and pessimism are roughly
constant. We can therefore conclude that lack of cognition plays an increasingly
important role in the observed overestimation of survival chances in old age.
Figure 10: Non-Linear PWF: Decomposition over Age
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Notes: Sample averages of predicted subjective survival beliefs according to equations (7)
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b
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Mortality Database (HMD).
5.2 Parameterized Linear PWFs
To investigate the sensitivity of our findings with respect to the functional form
of the PWF, we repeat our regressions for a neo-additive PWF (Chateauneuf
et al. 2007a), which is linear for interior survival probabilities, thereby approxi-
mating the non-linear model. The main advantage of the linear model is that we
can interpret coefficient estimates directly as marginal effects. Furthermore, it is
straightforward to add additional control variables in the linear framework. How-
ever, one drawback is that the neo-additive PWF is only a crude approximation
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to answering patterns for extreme OSPs close to 0% or 100%. In addition, the
structural parameters are only partially identified. In particular, without further
assumptions, we cannot identify the base bias and the marginal effect of an in-
crease of cognitive weakness; cf. Appendix B.2. To identify both, we invoke our
insights from the estimates of the non-linear PWF and derive in Appendix B.2
an indirect approach to identify both effects.26 There, we derive the following
reduced form specification of the linear model:
SSBi,h,m(h) = β0 + β1OSPi,h,m(h) + β2ci,h−2
(
OSPi,h,m(h) −OSP0
)
+ γ1pi,h−2 + γ2oi,h−2 + γ3 (pi,h−2ci,h−2) + γ4 (oi,h−2ci,h−2) . (9)
The results from estimating (9) are summarized in Table 4. All coefficient
estimates on the pure effects are of the expected sign and are significant, whereas
the interaction terms between cognition and the motivational variables are small
and insignificant. This latter finding is convenient for our decomposition analysis
because it means that the marginal effects of an increase in cognitive weakness
as defined earlier can be identified by setting these interactions to zero. This
marginal effect is accordingly given by βˆ2
(
OSPi,h,m(h) − ÔSP 0
)
. Since βˆ2 < 0,
the effect is negative (positive) for OSPi,h,m(h) > ÔSP 0 (OSPi,h,m(h) < ÔSP 0),
which reflects the clockwise tilting of the PWF induced by an increase of cognitive
weakness, just as in the non-linear model.27 To illustrate the effects of cognitive
weakness, consider first an individual with an OSP of OSPi,h,m(h) = 0.9. For
this person, the marginal effect is −0.0107 · (0.9− 0.3676) · 100%p = −0.6%p.
Likewise, for a person with an OSP of OSPi,h,m(h) = 0.1, the effect is positive
at 0.3%p. Our estimates also suggest that a one-point increase of pessimism
leads respondents to underestimate survival changes by 1.7%p, and a one-point
increase of optimism leads respondents to overestimate them by 2.6%p.28
26To identify the base bias, we postulate that the base bias plus the effect of cognition,
ŜSB
bc
, intersects with the line of the base bias, ŜSB
b
, in the same point on the 45-degree line,
just as we found for the non-linear model. Accordingly, parameter OSP0 is estimated from the
intersection of ŜSB
bc
with the 45-degree line.
27Our estimate of OSP0 of 0.36 is very close to the corresponding estimate for the non-linear
model; cf. Table 3.
28Finally, comparing the AIC between Tables 3 and 4, there is no statistical difference in the
goodness of fit between the non-linear and linear models.
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Table 4: Linear Model: The Effects of Cognition and Motivational Measures on
Subjective Survival Beliefs
point estimate CI- CI+
Constant 0.0486 -0.0506 0.1451
OSP 0.6316 0.5691 0.6929
OSP × Cog. Weak. -0.0107 -0.0155 -0.0059
Pessimism -0.0167 -0.0307 -0.0016
Optimism 0.0261 0.0110 0.0412
Optimism × Cog. Weak. -0.0004 -0.0015 0.0009
Pessimism × Cog. Weak. 0.0000 -0.0012 0.0010
OSP0 0.3571 0.3019 0.4126
AIC 2946.1 2735.5 3137.8
Notes: Number of observations: 8858. Column 2 shows the point estimates. Columns 3
and 4 show the respective bounds of the 95%-confidence intervals (CI- and CI+), which are
calculated with the percentile method (1,000 replications). AIC: Akaike (1973) information
criterion. Source: Own calculations, Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
In addition to these interpretations of the marginal effects, we decompose the
linear probability weighting functions analogously to equation (8) and Figures 9
and 10, with details provided in Appendix B.2. This confirms our main findings
for the non-linear model: the quantitative roles of our cognitive measure and of
the two motivational variables for the age-specific differences between SSBs and
OSPs are very similar. Thus, our findings for the non-linear model are robust to
the linear approximation.
The Linear Model and Statistical Learning. On the basis of formal models
of statistical learning, individuals learn their individual OSP by obtaining more
information. This suggests that they base their survival beliefs on the OSP and
additional variables (e.g., those we use to predict the respective OSPs) as well
as (in case of biased beliefs) cognitive and motivational factors. A snapshot of a
reduced form learning model, as in Viscusi (1985) and Smith et al. (2001), and
for biased beliefs in Ludwig and Zimper (2013) and Groneck et al. (2016), can
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be approximated as a linear regression by adding controls to (9) so that
SSBi,h,m(h) = β0 + β1OSPi,h,m(h) + β2ci,h−2
(
OSPi,h,m(h) −OSP0
)
+ γ1pi,h−2 + γ2oi,h−2 + γ3 (pi,h−2ci,h−2) + γ4 (oi,h−2ci,h−2) + ~χ′~xi,h,
(10)
where ~xi,h is the vector of control variables.
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Table 5: Linear Model: The Effects of Cognition and Motivational Measures on
Subjective Survival Beliefs: Adding Control Variables
point estimate CI- CI+
Constant -0.0093 -0.3379 0.3371
OSP 0.4081 0.3032 0.5067
OSP × Cog. Weak. -0.0111 -0.0161 -0.0065
Pessimism -0.0116 -0.0253 0.0032
Optimism 0.0211 0.0058 0.0358
Optimism × Cog. Weak. -0.0002 -0.0013 0.0010
Pessimism × Cog. Weak. -0.0004 -0.0015 0.0007
OSP0 0.3729 0.2616 0.6204
AIC 2588.3 2336.0 2741.6
Notes: Number of observations: 8858. Column 2 shows the point estimates. Columns 3
and 4 show the respective bounds of the 95%-confidence intervals (CI- and CI+), which are
calculated with the percentile method (1,000 replications). AIC: Akaike (1973) information
criterion. Source: Own calculations, Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Human Mortal-
ity Database (HMD).
The results on our main parameters of interest are reported in Table 5, and
estimates for the control variables are contained in Table 8 of Appendix B.2
(which are of the expected sign and are in line with findings in the literature).
Our main findings from Table 4 are unchanged. The coefficient on the constant
decreases and becomes very imprecise (i.e., the constant is basically zero) and
29Analogously, we could replace in (7) the variable OSPi,h,m(h) with func-
tion f
(
OSPi,h,m(h), ~x
)
, for f : OSPi,h,m(h), ~x→ [0, 1]. E.g., f could be a logistic function or a
hazard function. We have experimented with such specifications but faced severe convergence
problems. We therefore rely on the linear model to investigate the robustness of our findings
w.r.t. the inclusion of control variables.
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the coefficient estimate on the OSP, βˆ1, decreases due to the additional explana-
tory power attributable to the control variables (also leading to a decrease in
the AIC, indicating better fit). One interpretation of the finding that additional
control variables matter for the formation of subjective survival beliefs and take
on explanatory power from the objective survival probabilities is that the base
bias indeed partially captures learning mechanisms in the face of uncertain sur-
vival beliefs. Otherwise, the parameter estimates are unchanged (the confidence
intervals overlap). Thus, our main findings on the effects of cognitive and moti-
vational factors for the formation of subjective survival beliefs are also robust to
the inclusion of control variables in the empirical specification.
5.3 Quantile Regressions
So far, our analyses have been based on a strong structural interpretation of
the data. In particular, we have postulated (and found) that cognitive weakness
leads to a clockwise tilting of the PWF and that optimism induces a parallel
upward shift of the PWF (respectively, pessimism leads to a parallel downward
shift). We now investigate the robustness of these findings by running quantile
regressions. This allows us to detect relationships that are not captured by mean
effects. In our quantile regressions, we take the difference between SSBs and
OSPs as a dependent variable. Additionally, we include the level of the objective
survival probability in our set of explanatory variables because the interval of our
dependent variable is directly linked to the level of the OSP. We analyze every
decile and estimate the results for all deciles jointly. As in our previous OLS
regressions, standard errors are bootstrapped. Our regression specification is
SSBi,h,m(h) −OSPi,h,m(h) =
β0 + β1OSPi,h,m(h) + β2ci,h + β3pi,h−2 + β4oi,h−2 + i,h,m(h). (11)
By including the OSP on the right-hand-side of the regression, we control
for biases induced by truncation and censoring, as underestimators cannot re-
port SSBs less than zero and overestimators cannot report SSBs above one. The
clockwise tilting of the PWF from increasing cognitive weakness we identified
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earlier would be consistent with negative estimates of β2 in lower percentiles and
positive estimates in upper percentiles. This would mean that increasing cogni-
tive weakness leads to a more pronounced underestimation for underestimators
(who, on average, have high OSPs) and a more pronounced overestimation for
overestimators (who, on average, have low OSPs). Irrespective of the percentiles,
we also expect that β3 < 0 and β4 > 0.
Figure 11: Quantile Regression: Coefficient Estimates
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Notes: Coefficient estimates of equation (11) by deciles of underestimation and the respec-
tive bounds of the 95%-confidence intervals, which are calculated with the percentile method
(1,000 replications). Source: Own calculations, Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Human
Mortality Database (HMD).
We report our results in Figure 11, thereby confirming our hypotheses. Inter-
estingly, we also find that the effects of optimism and pessimism are strongest for
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the intermediate percentiles. This is consistent with the non-linear probability
weighting function: in the lowest percentiles, we have individuals with, on av-
erage, high OSPs, where the structure of the non-linear PWF forces subjective
beliefs to converge to 1; cf. Figure 2. Likewise, in the highest percentile, individ-
uals have, on average, low OSPs, which forces subjective beliefs to converge to 0.
Thus, under a non-linear PWF, there is less room for motivational variables to
impact the formation of SSBs at extreme OSPs of 0 and 1. This is reflected in
our estimates shown in Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 11.
Overall, our results for these less-parametric quantile regressions support our
structural interpretation of the data by use of inverse S-shaped probability weight-
ing functions.
5.4 The Effects of Motivational Factors on Mortality
In our estimation of individual-level OSPs in Section 2, we include cognition as a
regressor in the hazard model.30 Therefore, our estimates in the previous subsec-
tions capture the effects of cognitive weakness on the formation of survival beliefs
beyond the effects that are channeled through the objective survival probabili-
ties. However, for sample reasons, we do not include motivational variables in
this hazard model, because they are only available from wave 8 onwards. If opti-
mists were more likely to survive and if pessimists were more likely to die, then
the observed deviations from the SSBs caused by these motivational attitudes we
identified would (at least partially) reflect additional information of respondents
on their objective mortality risk rather than psychological biases.
Table 6: The Impact of Optimism and Pessimism on Mortality
point estimate CI- CI+
Optimism -0.0089 -0.0380 0.0256
Pessimism 0.0277 -0.0041 0.0592
Notes: Column 2 shows the point estimates. Columns 3 and 4 show the re-
spective bounds of the 95%-confidence intervals (CI- and CI+), which are cal-
culated with the percentile method (1,000 replications). Source: Own calcula-
tions, Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Human Mortality Database (HMD).
30We find that the lack of cognition is positively correlated with mortality.
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We can address this concern in a smaller sub-sample by re-estimating the
hazard model with the inclusion of the motivational variables, using HRS data
from waves 8-12. The results are shown in Table 6. We find neither optimism
nor pessimism to be significant at the 5% significance level. This supports our
interpretation of the effects of optimism and pessimism on SSBs as reflecting
psychological biases.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper compares subjective survival beliefs (SSBs) with objective survival
probabilities (OSPs) that we estimate based on individual-level characteristics.
We establish a twofold and related strong regularity of survival misperceptions.
First, relatively young respondents in our sample underestimate their chances
of survival, whereas relatively old respondents overestimate them. Second, re-
spondents overestimate survival chances with low objective probabilities and un-
derestimate chances with high objective probabilities. Based on this finding, we
estimate inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions on the data and es-
tablish a strong age dependency in the shape of these functions. Our coefficient
estimates suggest that implied measures of pessimism and of cognitive weak-
nesses are increasing with age. Direct psychological measures confirm these age
patterns.
Based on these descriptive findings, we estimate reduced form variants of
probability weighting functions. In particular, we find that biases induced by the
motivational factor optimism leads to an overestimation of subjective survival
beliefs by approximately 10 percentage points, on average, whereas the motiva-
tional factor pessimism leads to a downward bias by approximately 5 percentage
points. Both biases are roughly constant in age. In contrast, increasing cognitive
weakness leads to an increasing upward bias in subjective survival beliefs. By
thus showing that these factors play an important role in the formation of sub-
jective beliefs, our results support the cognitive and motivational interpretations
attached to the parameters of inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions
in the theoretical and experimental literature (Gonzalez and Wu 1999; Wakker
2010). Our findings also suggest that cognitive rather than motivational factors
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play an increasingly important quantitative role in the overestimation of survival
beliefs in old age.
Our work gives rise to two related questions for future research: Can sub-
jective beliefs with respect to other economic risks such as earnings or health
risks be modeled similarly, and what is the implication of biases in subjective
beliefs for economic decisions? As to the second part of this question, we employ
in Groneck et al. (2016) a life-cycle model of consumption and savings to show
that biased survival beliefs can contribute to resolving well-known life-cycle sav-
ing puzzles.31 Our results in the present paper shed more light on the driving
forces of such biased survival beliefs. In a standard life-cycle model of consump-
tion and savings, they alter the effective discount factor, e.g., pessimism would
increase discounting by decreasing survival beliefs. However, there may also be
direct effects of psychological factors. For instance, according to the recent theo-
retical work by Gabaix and Laibson (2017), lack of cognition leads to higher pure
time discounting, and Binswanger and Salm (2017) find that the association
between subjective probabilities and decisions increases with an individual’s cog-
nitive strength, whereas lower cognitive skills are more strongly associated with
heuristics. Furthermore, in extended models with multiple risks, e.g., earnings
risks and health risks, psychological factors will also affect the formation of beliefs
with respect these risks (Dominitz and Manski 1997; Rozsypal and Schlafmann
2017). For these reasons, the answer of how psychological factors affect economic
decisions over the life-cycle can, in our view, only be provided by use of structural
life-cycle models that enable researchers to explicitly take into account all these
mechanisms.
31Direct measures of subjective beliefs are crucial in this research agenda because this ap-
proach circumvents the inherent difficulty of disentangling the effects of biased beliefs from
preference parameters such as risk aversion (Wu and Gonzalez 1996; Constantinos et al. 2015).
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A Supplementary Appendix: Data
A.1 Data Sets and Samples
The main dataset used in this paper is the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
and the Human Mortality Database (HMD).
A.1.1 Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a national representative panel study
on a biennial basis, see Juster and Suzman (1995) for an overview.32 The main
purpose of the HRS is to contribute a rich panel data set to the research of re-
tirement, health insurance, saving, and economic well-being. Since 2006 (wave 8)
the HRS is complemented by a rich set of psychosocial information. These data
are collected in each biennial wave from an alternating (at random) 50% of all
core panel participants who were visited for an enhanced face-to-face interview
(EFTF).33 Thus, longitudinal data are available in four-year intervals and there-
fore the first panel with psychosocial variables is provided in 2010.
Hazard Model. We employ a hazard model to predict individual level objec-
tive survival probabilities (OSPs) based on HRS panel mortality. As the time
horizons of OSPs and SSBs have to be aligned, c.f. Table 1, our sample has to
cover between 11 and 15 years. In the HRS, individuals younger than 65 were
asked about their subjective belief to survive another 20− 35 years. As the HRS
data set does not yet cover this large time horizon, we cannot compute OSPs
for this age group and therefore restrict our sample to individuals older than 65.
32The survey is administered by the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of
Michigan and mainly funded by the National Institute of Aging (NIA).
33In 2006 (wave 8) respondents were sent an additional questionnaire in case they were part
of this random 50% subsample—provided they were alive and either they or a proxy completed
at least part of the interview in person. In 2008 (wave 9), respondents who were not selected
for the EFTF interview in 2006 were automatically selected in 2008. As in 2006 they were
sent a questionnaire in case they were alive or a proxy completed at least part of the interview
in person. In 2010 (wave 10) respondents who had completed the EFTF interview in 2006
were again chosen to participate in this mode of data collection. As a result the first panel is
available in 2010.
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Since we also do not have information on SSBs for individuals older than 89, we
further restrict to individuals of age less than 90.
The sample for the hazard model includes waves 4-12 (years 1998 − 2014).
We exclude waves < 4 due to consistency problems in how some variables were
measured. This concerns questions on physical health such as activities of daily
living (ADL).
Cross-Sectional Analysis. The HRS contains variables about psychosocial
factors from wave 8 (year 2006) onwards. In our analyses we use psychological
variables in lags. Our measure of cognitive weakness is not (yet) available in
wave 12 (year 2014). Since we use lags, the main cross-sectional analyses of the
paper is restricted to waves 9− 12 (years 2008− 2014).
A.1.2 Human Mortality Base (HMD)
As we describe in Section A.2, next to a long list of socioeconomic and health
variables, we condition OSPs also on average objective survival probabilities
(AOSPs), which requires the use of (predicted) cohort life tables in order to
capture the time tend of survival risk. Our out of sample predictions of cohort
specific survival rates are based on a statistical model, which we estimate on the
basis of period life tables taken from the Human Mortality Database (HMD) for
years 1993 to 2013.34
A.2 Estimation of Objective Survival Probabilities (OSP)
We condition the estimation of the hazard model on average objective survival
probabilities (AOSPs) and several individual level observable variables.
A.2.1 Average Objective Survival Probabilities
We construct life tables for each cohort c on the basis of a sequence of period t
life tables. A period t life table contains average population mortality rates for
34The Human Mortality Database (HMD) is a cooperation of the Department of Demography
at the University of California and the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research in
Rostock.
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ages j = 0, 1, 2, ..., J in year t, denoted by δj,t which is the average probability
of an individual aged j born in year c = t − j of dying in year t. A cohort c
life table gives the average mortality rate of individuals of a given birth cohort c
and in principle are obtained by simple rearrangements of period life tables. If
period life tables are available from years tmin to tmax, then the cohort life table
of cohort c is restricted to the age interval {max(tmin − c; 0), tmax − c}. For our
purpose, however, we require for several cohorts mortality rates that exceed the
age limit tmax − c.35 Hence, we have to predict future period life-tables from
which, by re-arrangement, we can extract the corresponding cohort life tables.
To this purpose, we estimate mortality processes by adopting the Lee and
Carter (1992) method and form predicted mortality rates on the basis of these
estimates. We accordingly specify that the log mortality rate log(δj,t) can be de-
composed into a vector of age-specific constants αj and age specific drift terms βj,
where the drift is determined by a single index kt according to
log(δj,t) = αj + βj · kt + εj,t (12)
where εj,t is some error term that captures age and time specific random de-
viations from this mortality trend. The single index kt is assumed to obey a
unit-root process with drift and error term t ∼ N (0, σ2 ):
kt = φ+ kt−1 + t (13)
We estimate these processes with data from 1950 onward (because of structural
breaks in earlier periods). The estimated drift terms are φˆ = −1.4460 and φˆ =
−1.8114 for men and women, respectively. Based on our estimates we predict
mortality rates until 2090 by holding constant the vectors ~ˆα, ~ˆβ and the drift
term φˆ and complete the cohort life tables on the basis of these estimates.
35For instance, period life tables are available from tmin = 1900 until tmax = 2013. Given
a cohort c = 1960 (i.e., age 50 in 2010), the (c = 1960)-cohort life table obtained via simple
rearrangement is restricted to the age interval {0, 53} because we only have period-t life tables
up to year t = 2013. Thus, one cannot obtain cohort c = 1960 mortality rates at ages above 53.
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A.2.2 Individual Objective Survival Probabilities
As described in Subsection 2.3 we base our estimates of OSPs on a Weibull (1951)
hazard model. We condition the baseline hazard in equation (1) on the AOSPs
and on several individual level observable variables, both included in xi. The
individual variables are summarized in Table 7.
Table 7: Variables Used in Hazard Model
Variable Description
Age In years
Male 1 if male, 0 otherwise
Black 1 if black, 0 if otherwise
Married 1 if married, 0 if otherwise
Subjective Health Status (Excellent) 1 if true, 0 if otherwise
Subjective Health Status (Very Good) 1 if true, 0 if otherwise
Subjective Health Status (Good) 1 if true, 0 if otherwise
Subjective Health Status (Poor) 1 if true, 0 if otherwise
Smoke (ever) 1 if true, 0 if otherwise
Smoke (now) 1 if true, 0 if otherwise
Drink (ever) 1 if true, 0 if otherwise
ADL Index Index between 0 and 3
Mobility Index Index between 0 and 5
Muscle Index Index between 0 and 4
Cognitive Weakness Index between 0 and 35
Ever have conditions
High blood pressure 1 if true, 0 if otherwise
Diabetes 1 if true, 0 if otherwise
Cancer 1 if true, 0 if otherwise
Lung Disease 1 if true, 0 if otherwise
Heart Diseases 1 if true, 0 if otherwise
Stroke 1 if true, 0 if otherwise
AOSP (12 years) Avg. OSP to survive another 12 years
A.3 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 12 shows the distribution of OSPs for the full sample and each interview
age group, cf. Table 1. Each subfigure also contains a red vertical line indi-
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cating the average objective survival probability for the respective age group.
The histograms reveal that there is a significant dispersion of objective survival
probabilities.36
Figure 12: Histograms of OSPs
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Notes: The red vertical line indicates the average objective survival probability. Source: Own
calculations, Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Human Mortality Database (HMD).
Figure 13 shows the corresponding distributions of SSBs. Average SSBs de-
crease as we move up across target age groups, as with OSPs. However, the
movement is not as pronounced as for the OSPs and the difference in the av-
erages depicted by the red lines in both figures just reflects the facts shown in
Figure 1 of the main text. Second, there are focal point answers at SSBs of 0, 0.5
and 1. Observe that the fraction of individuals providing a focal point answer
at 1 decreases whereas the fraction giving answer 0 increases when the target
36Observe that using AOSPs instead would result in only five different survival probabilities,
one for each target age group.
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age increases. This indicates that focal point answers do have information con-
tent that goes beyond simple heuristics that individuals may apply when being
confronted with such complicated questions about survival prospects.
Figure 13: Histograms of SSBs
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Notes: The red vertical line indicates the average subjective survival belief. Source: Own
calculations, Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
A.4 Bootstrap
Standard errors of the parameters of our regressions have to be corrected in
order to account for the estimation variance of OSPs. We accommodate this
by implementing a two-sample bootstrap procedure with 1, 000 replications to
estimate the standard errors of our coefficient estimates. In this procedure we
correct for the estimation variance in objective survival probabilities as follows.37
37Note, that our two samples are both based on the HRS dataset. The first sample is based
on the sample used to estimate the OSPs and the second sample is used in the overall regression
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In each bootstrap replication we (i) draw a sample with replacement from the
HRS sample used to estimate OSPs, (ii) estimate the OSPs, (iii) draw a sample
with replacement from the cross-sectional sample used for regression analysis,
(iv) perform regression analysis. Based on the resulting estimates we compute
standard errors using the percentile method.
B Supplementary Appendix: The Linear Model
B.1 The Neo-Additive PWF
As an alternative to non-linear probability weighting functions, we estimate linear
approximations in form of neo-additive probability capacities (Chateauneuf et al.
2007b). For OSPi,h,t ∈ (0, 1)38 the neo-additive capacity is linear and writes as
SSBi,h,t = (1− ξlh)(1− θlh) + ξlhOSPi,h,t (14)
where ξlh ∈ [0, 1], θlh ∈ [0, 1] are parameters that are the analogues to parame-
ters ξh and θh of the non-linear specification in (5). To see this observe that ξ
l
h
controls the slope of the function, whereby for ξlh = 1 the line in (14) corresponds
with the 45-degree line. Therefore, any ξlh ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as a measure
of likelihood insensitivity. Likewise, 1 − θlh ∈ [0, 1] determines the intersection
of (14) with the 45-degree line, whereby the intersection moves down when θlh
increases. Accordingly, θlh can be interpreted as a measure of pessimism.
Figure 14 shows the linearly estimated probability weighting functions and
Figure 15 shows the age patterns of the parameter estimates ξlh = ξ¯
l
h, θ
l
h = θ¯m(h),
again with the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. As for the non-linear
specification in the main text, the coefficient estimates ξh = ξ¯m(h), shown in
Panel (a) of Figure 15, are decreasing in interview age h up to interview age
group 85-89 where the estimates are very imprecise.39 The point estimates suggest
that a one percentage point increase of the OSP for age group 65-69 leads to a 0.6
analyses.
38Interior OSPs follow from our specification in (3).
39The imprecision for this age group is much larger than for the corresponding non-linear
specification, cf. Figure 5.
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percentage point increase of the associated SSB, on average. At age group 75-79
the effect is only 0.4 percentage points.
Figure 14: Estimated Neo-Additive (Linear) Probability Weighting Functions
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Notes: Bootstrapped (1,000 replications) 95%-confidence intervals, based on the percentile
method. Source: Own calculations, Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Human Mortality
Database (HMD).
As with the non-linear specification, the age pattern of pessimism is less clear-
cut. Pessimism increases from age group 70-74 to age group 80-84. (Estimates
are very imprecise for age group 85-89.) As previously, we also observe that
pessimism initially decreases from age group 65-69 to age group 70-74.
B.2 Regression Analyses
B.2.1 The Linear Regression Specification & Identification
We derive the linear specification from using (6) in (14), but also superimpose
additional structure based on our insights from the non-linear model. Specifically,
we assume that there is no motivational base effect, which in this linear model
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Figure 15: Neo-Additive PWF: Likelihood Sensitivity and Pessimism
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(b) Pessimism θlh
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in Panel (b) and the bootstrapped (1,000 replications) 95% confidence intervals, based on the
percentile method. Source: Own calculations, Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Human
Mortality Database (HMD).
means that θ0 = 0. As in the non-linear model, this assumption implies that the
base bias, SSBbi,h,m(h), and the base bias plus the effect of cognition SSB
bc
i,h,m(h),
intersect with the 45-degree line in the same point, OSP0.
Under these assumptions and combining (6) with (14), we get
SSBi,h,m(h) = (OSP0 + θ1pi,h−2 + θ2oi,h−2) (1− (ξ0 + ξ1ci,h−2)) + (ξ0 + ξ1ci,h−2)OSPi,h,m(h).
(15)
Before turning to the reduced form of (15) and the crucial question of identifica-
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tion, observe that the isolated effects analogous to (8) are given by
SSBbi,h,m(h) = OSP0 (1− ξ0) + ξ0OSPi,h,m(h) (16a)
SSBbci,h,m(h) = OSP0 (1− (ξ0 + ξ1ci,h−2)) + (ξ0 + ξ1ci,h−2)OSPi,h,m(h) (16b)
= SSBbi,h,m(h) + ξ1ci,h−2
(
OSPi,h,m(h) −OSP0
)
,
SSBbpi,h,m(h) = (OSP0 + θ1pi,h−2) (1− ξ0) + ξ0OSPi,h,m(h) (16c)
= SSBbi,h,m(h) + θ1 (1− ξ0) pi,h−2
SSBboi,h,m(h) = (OSP0 + θ2oi,h−2) (1− ξ0) + ξ0OSPi,h,m(h) (16d)
= SSBbi,h,m(h) + θ2 (1− ξ0) oi,h−2.
From the second line in (16b) we observe that the “pure” (i.e., ignoring the
interactions with motivational variables) marginal effect of an increase of cogni-
tive weakness is ξ1
(
OSPi,h,m(h) −OSP0
)
. For ξ1 < 0—i.e., increasing cognitive
weakness leads to a flattening of the PWF—we find that increasing cognitive
weakness gives rise to stronger underestimation for OSPi,h,m(h) > OSP0, and to
stronger overestimation for OSPi,h,m(h) < OSP0, just as in the non-linear model.
Likewise, we observe from (16c), that the marginal effect of an increase of pes-
simism is given by θ1 (1− ξ0), respectively the effect of an increase of optimism
by θ2 (1− ξ0).
The reduced form specification follows from rewriting (15) as
SSBi,h,m(h) = OSP0 (1− ξ0) + ξ0OSPi,h,m(h) + ξ1ci,h−2
(
OSPi,h,m(h) −OSP0
)
+
+ θ1(1− ξ0)pi,h−2 + θ2(1− ξ0)oi,h−2 − ξ1θ1pi,h−2ci,h−2 − ξ1θ2oi,h−2ci,h−2
which gives
SSBi,h,m(h) = β0 + β1OSPi,h,m(h) + β2ci,h−2
(
OSPi,h,m(h) −OSP0
)
+ γ1pi,h−2 + γ2oi,h−2 + γ3 (pi,h−2ci,h−2) + γ4 (oi,h−2ci,h−2)
= β0 + β1OSPi,h,m(h) + β2ci,h−2OSPi,h,m(h) + β3ci,h−2
+ γ1pi,h−2 + γ2oi,h−2 + γ3 (pi,h−2ci,h−2) + γ4 (oi,h−2ci,h−2) , (17)
where β3 = −β2OSPo. The parameters in the second line can be determined
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by a simple linear regression, where the regression coefficients are related to the
structural model parameters by
β0 = OSP0 (1− ξ0) (18a)
β1 = ξ0 (18b)
β2 = ξ1 (18c)
β3 = −ξ1OSP0 (18d)
γ1 = θ1(1− ξ0) (18e)
γ2 = θ2(1− ξ0) (18f)
γ3 = ξ1θ1 (18g)
γ4 = ξ1θ2. (18h)
In general, the reduced form does not exactly identify all parameters of the model
because there are 8 parameters in the reduced form and 5 in the model. What is
identified is the direct marginal effect of an increase in OSPs given by β1 = ξ0, and
the marginal effects of pessimism is given by γ1 = θ1(1− ξ0), respectively of opti-
mism by γ2 = θ2(1− ξ1). Hence, we expect that β1 ∈ (0, 1), γ1 < 0, γ2 > 0. While
the marginal effect of an increase of the interaction between the OSP and cogni-
tion, β2 = ξ1, is identified (and while we therefore expect that β2 < 0), the “pure”
marginal effect of an increase in cognitive weakness, ξ1
(
OSPi,h,m(h) −OSP0
)
, is
not identified because OSP0 is not identified. To see this, observe that using (18b)
in (18a) gives OSP0 =
β0
1−β1 , whereas using (18c) in (18d) gives OSP0 = −
β3
β2
and
in general β0
1−β1 6= −
β3
β2
.40
We resolve this issue of non-identification by determining the intersection of
the total effect of cognition for each individual i, ŜSB
bc
i,h, with the 45-degree line,
40To illustrate the problem of non-identification, observe that our point estimates reported in
Table 4 suggest that OSP0 =
0.0486
1−0.6316 ≈ 0.1318 or OSP0 = − 0.0109−0.0107 ≈ 1.0179 (which violates
the bound constraint OSP0 ∈ [0, 1]).
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i.e., we determine OSP0,i for each individual i from
ŜSB
bc
i,h(OSP0,i) = βˆ0 + βˆ1OSP0,i + βˆ2ci,h−2OSP0,i + βˆ3ci,h−2 = OSP0,i
⇔ OSP0,i = βˆ0 + βˆ3ci,h−2
1−
(
βˆ1 + βˆ2ci,h−2
) .
Taking the mean across all individuals gives our (mean group) estimate ÔSP 0 =
1
n
∑n
i=1OSP0,i. For our decomposition analysis we further require that the base
bias intersects with the 45-degree line in the same point. To this purpose we
modify the base bias by an additional additive shifter β˜0 and accordingly write
41
SSBmbi,h,m(h) = β0 + β˜0 + β1OSPi,h,m(h).
We determine β˜0,i from
ŜSB
mb
i (OSP0,i) = βˆ0 + β˜0,i + βˆ1OSP0,i = OSP0,i
⇔ β˜0,i =
(
1− βˆ1
)
OSP0,i − βˆ0.
Again taking the mean across all i we get the (mean group) estimate ̂˜β0 =
1
n
∑n
i=1 β˜0,i. To determine the confidence intervals of OSP0 and β˜0 we repeat
these steps for all bootstrap iterations.42
B.2.2 Decomposition Analyses of Linear Model
The decomposition of the linear probability weighting function is presented in
Figure 16. Except for the behavior in the tails, findings are very similar to those
from the non-linear model. The more interesting decomposition is the one over
age shown in Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 17. Again, our results are very similar
41This implies that the additional effects of cognition are reduced by the shifter β˜0, hence
∆SSBmci,h,m(h) = β2ci,h−2OSPi,h,m(h) + β3ci,h−2 − β˜0.
42For the shifter β˜0 we get as point estimate 0.0853 with 95% confidence inter-
val [0.0001, 0.1675].
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to those from the non-linear model. The effect of cognitive weakness is basically
the same, pessimism leads to a slightly stronger average underestimation and
optimism to a stronger average overestimation than for the non-linear model.
Figure 16: Decomposition of Neo-Additive (Linear) PWFs
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bc
;
“base+pess.”: ŜSB
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B.2.3 Statistical Learning and Control Variables
Derivation of Reduced From. To derive the linear reduced form specifi-
cation, again start from (14) and replace the objective survival rate OSPi,h,t
with (1− w(~xi,h))OSPi,h,t+w(~xi,h)pi0 w(~xi,h) where pi0 is some prior belief and w(~xi,h)
is a weighting function. This linear approximation to the learning model of Gro-
neck et al. (2016) gives rise to the following specification
SSBi,h,t = (1− ξlh)(1− θlh) + ξlhOSPi,h,t + ξlhw(~xi,h) (pi0 −OSPi,h,t) ,
which nests specification (14). Using (6) in the above, linearly approximating the
weighting function w(~xi,h) and ignoring all interactions between ~xi,h, ci,h, OSPi,h,t
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Figure 17: Neo-Additive (Linear) PWF: Decomposition over Age
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for simplicity43 results in (10).
Results on Control Variables. Table 8 shows the results of our estimation
for the control variables.
C Supplementary Appendix: Focal Point An-
swers
To investigate the sensitivity of our results with respect to focal point answers, we
repeat the estimation of non-linear PWFs by excluding observations with focal
point answers at SSBs of 0%, 50% and 100%. Results are presented in Figure 18.
In contrast to the corresponding Figure 4, probability weighting functions for
the highest target age group are now downward sloping. Since we regard up-
ward sloping PWFs as plausible, this finding is another indication (beyond the
43In a regression where we included these interactions the AIC decreased.
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histograms shown in Appendix A) that focal point answers do have information
content, which justifies including all these observations in our main analyses.
Figure 18: Estimated Non-Linear Probability Weighting Functions: Excl. Focal
Points
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calculations, Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Human Mortality Database (HMD).
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Table 8: Linear Model: The Effects of Cognition and Motivational Measures on
Subjective Survival Beliefs: Parameter Estimates on Control Variables
coefficient CI- CI+
Constant -0.0093 -0.3379 0.3371
Wave 9 0.0221 0.0111 0.0318
Wave 10 -0.0120 -0.0234 0.0012
TA 65 0.1649 0.0766 0.2564
TA 70 0.1469 0.0764 0.2191
TA 75 0.0817 0.0328 0.1289
TA 80 0.0665 0.0348 0.0963
Age 0.0007 -0.0034 0.0044
Male 0.0047 -0.0099 0.0180
Black 0.0987 0.0783 0.1217
Married -0.0298 -0.0470 -0.0108
Widowed -0.0201 -0.0402 0.0010
Mom Alive 0.0308 0.0081 0.0542
Dad Alive 0.0879 0.0441 0.1309
College 0.0127 0.0002 0.0258
Shlt 0.0785 0.0655 0.0912
ADL Index -0.0101 -0.0224 0.0027
Mobility Index -0.0051 -0.0116 0.0011
Muscle Index -0.0097 -0.0151 -0.0045
Obesity 0.0059 -0.0071 0.0178
Smoke (now) -0.0077 -0.0310 0.0162
Smoke (ever) 0.0240 0.0109 0.0360
Drink (ever) 0.0165 0.0051 0.0285
Ever have conditions
High blood pressure -0.0134 -0.0255 -0.0010
Diabetes -0.0050 -0.0208 0.0104
Cancer -0.0207 -0.0351 -0.0069
Lung Disease 0.0080 -0.0114 0.0281
Heart Disease -0.0150 -0.0299 -0.0017
Stroke 0.0253 0.0057 0.0461
Psych. Problems 0.0171 0.0000 0.0337
Arthritis 0.0160 0.0035 0.0287
Notes: Column 2 shows the point estimates, columns 3 and 4 the respective bounds of 95%-
confidence intervals (CI- and CI+), which are calculated with the percentile method (1,000
replications). Source: Own calculations, Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Human Mor-
tality Database (HMD).
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